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Regulation of Pharmaceutical Advertising
Anthony S. Zito, Jr.*
F EDERAL TRADE COMMISSION regulation of pharmaceutical advertising
is a subject of considerable current interest. The criteria for de-
termining the acceptability of these advertisements are still evolving,
and a definitive set of rules has not yet been fully articulated. Neverthe-
less certain trends are developing.' One of the major objectives of this
paper is to predict the ultimate form of these rules. Based upon con-
sideration of a limited number of very recent cases, discussed in detail
in this paper, the rules which appear to be evolving are three:
1. Every individual statement contained in the advertisement must
be true.2
2. Even if each individual statement is, itself, technically and lit-
erally true, the overall impression created by the advertisement,
when read by the audience toward whom it is directed, must
not be false or misleading.3
3. Even if each individual statement is technically and literally
true, where additional information is necessary in order to
properly evaluate the significance of those statements, alffma-
tive disclosure of that information will be required.4
The implications of this evolutionary process are probably far
broader than merely its application to pharmaceutical products. The
rules applied to pharmaceuticals today are likely to be applied to
other products tomorrow.
Pharmaceutical advertising typically takes a variety of forms-the
use of mass media, distinctive labeling, direct mail, and verbal presen-
tations by "detail men." It is directed to two distinct audiences-the
physician and the layman; and, to further complicate matters, covers
two vastly different types of products-prescription and over-the-counter
drugs.5 The scope of the present paper will be limited to that portion
* Assistant Professor of Law, Chase College of Law.
1 Kintner, The Revitalized Federal Trade Commission: A Two-Year Evaluation, 30
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1143, 1148 (1955); F.T.C. v. Sterling Drug Inc., 317 F. 2d 669 (2d Cir.
1963), initial decision dismissing the complaint, 3 C.C.H. Trade Cas. Reg. Rep. 16, 496
(1963).
2 Opinion on interpretation of an advertisement in Heintz W. Kirchner, F.T.C.,
Docket No. 8538 (1963); 11 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 663 (1934); 82 U. Pa. L. Rev. 664 (1934);
43 Yale L. J. 1338 (1934).
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 A "drug" is defined by the Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act as any article
recognized by certain official compendia or "articles intended for use in the diagnosis,
(Continued on next page)
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of the broad subject which is congruent with the area regulated by the
Federal Trade Commission: mass media advertising of non-prescription
drugs to the general public.6
Historically, the people of the United States have always favored
self-medication. Indeed, until the passage of the Food, Drug and Cos-
metic Act7 in 1938, any drug could be advertised and sold directly to
the consuming public without a physician's prescription.8 The existence
of a strong continuing Congressional policy in favor of self-medication
is evidenced by the fact that the 1938 Act treated the new category of
prescription drugs as an exception to the general category, having
special requirements, rather that exempting over-the-counter drugs
from prescription requirements.9 The courts have generally assumed
the existence of this policy without question.'0
It must be recognized, however, that self-diagnosis and medication
are not without pitfalls. As the frontiers of medical knowledge advance,
the complexities of the human mechanism become more and more ap-
(Continued from preceding page)
cure, mitigation, treatment or prevention of disease ... and articles intended to affect
the structure or any function of the body . . .," 52 Stat. § 1041 (1938), 21 U.S.C.
§ 321 (g) (1964). The phrase "prescription drugs" is used in this paper synonymously
with "ethical drugs" and is defined by the Act as a drug which, "because of its tox-
ity or other potentiality for harmful effects, or the method of its use, is not safe for
use except under the supervision of a (licensed) practitioner . . . ." 52 Stat. § 1050
(1938), 21 U.S.C. § 353(b) (1964). The phrase "over-the-counter (OTC) drugs" is
not defined by the Act but, by implication, encompasses all non-prescription drugs.
6 The Wheeler-Lea Amendment of 1938 to the Federal Trade Commission Act, 38
Stat. § 717 (1914), 15 U.S.C. § 41 (1963) et seq., vested the Federal Trade Commission
with the responsibility for regulation of all advertising pertaining to foods, drugs,
curative devices, and cosmetics:
"Dissemination of false advertisements-unlawfulness.
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person .. . to disseminate .. .any false
advertisement .. .by any means, for the purpose of inducing . . .the purchase
of foods, drugs, devices, or cosmetics." 15 U.S.C. 41, § 12 (1963).
Labeling for all drugs, and advertising directed to members of the medical profes-
sion, however, is specifically exempted by section 15 of the Act:
The term "false advertisement" . . . means an advertisement other than labeling.
... No advertisement for a drug shall be deemed to be false if it is disseminated
only to members of the medical profession . .. (and conforms to the require-
ments of the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act) 15 U.S.C., 41 § 15 (1963).
Labeling, which is defined as written, printed, or graphic matter directly accom-
panying the drug, in, or together with, its sales package, and advertisements to the
medical profession are regulated by the Food and Drug Administration pursuant to
the powers vested in it by the Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1961),
et seq. Since prescription drugs may not be advertised except to licensed practi-
tioners, this effectively places sole responsibility for regulation of these items solely
in the hands of the FDA. The details of regulation within FDA's authority is be-
yond the scope of the present paper, but the detailed and complex regulations in this
area may be found at 21 CFR § 1.100 (1970), et seq.
7 52 Stat. § 1 (1938), et seq. 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1964) et seq.
8 Digest of the New Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act, U. S. Food and Drug
Admin., June 27, 1938.
9 Id.
10 Cf., for example, J. B. Williams Co., Inc. v. F.T.C., 381 F. 2d 884 (6th Cir. 1967):
"We can find no Congressional policy against self-medication on a trial and error




parent. In these days of radioactive tracers, biochemical analysis, and
multidisciplined clinical studies, the cure-all Indian Snake Oil remedy
has lost much of its appeal. We have come to recognize the fact that a
misleading statement regarding the safety or efficacy of a drug may be
far more than an economic cheat; it may be positively harmful in that
it can encourage the sick individual to forego needed medical attention."
The public is particularly poorly equipped to evaluate claims made
for pharmaceutical preparations because any such evaluation must be
based upon sophisticated scientific knowledge. When the layman is told,
"hospital tests prove that Bio-Dyne (in Preparation-H) rushes the body's
healing oxygen to the affected area," 12 how can he assess the meaning
of this statement? What were the nature and scope of the hospital tests?
Do they conform to modern standards of adequate clinical studies? What
is Bio-Dyne? Does it really increase the oxygen content of the tissues?
Even if it does, what has oxygen to do with the healing of hemorrhoids?
Is it effective in all cases? What other treatments are available? The
answers to these, and many other questions, are essential to a realistic
evaluation of the advertisement, yet the layman is unlikely to know
enough to ask them, much less where to obtain the answers.
The Preparation-H advertisement quoted above is a good example
of the classical problem in the regulation of pharmaceutical advertising
-misrepresentation by overt statement. The Federal Trade Commission
and the courts have had little difficulty in recent years in suppressing
advertisements in this category. For example, despite, the court's
traditional reluctance to interfere with long established trade names, 13
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals did not hesitate in enforcing an FTC
order banning the use of the word "Liver" in the trade name "Carter's
Little Liver Pills" and any advertising of the product when the FTC
showed that the product contained no liver or liver extract, and had no
effect on the function of the liver. 14 Since that decision, the product
has been known as "Carter's Little Pills." In another case, the Fifth
Circuit found that a statement that "today baldness is unnecessary . . .
hopeless cases are few . . . ninety-five percent of all cases of hair loss
came within the scope of . . . treatment" is false and misleading and
and it is within the power of the FTC to prohibit its uses in advertising. 15
Again, where substantial medical evidence demonstrates that 90 to 95
percent of all baldness results from causes other than microbial infec-
11 Cf., for example the testimony in the Krebiozen case, Ivy v. Katzenbach, 351 F. 2d
32 (7th Cir. 1965), cert. denied 382 U.S. 958 (1965).
12 Radio advertisement for Preparation-H, a hemorrhoid remedy manufactured by
American Home Products, Inc.
13 Elliot Knitwear, Inc. v. F.T.C., 266 F. 2d 787 (2d Cir. 1959).
14 Carter Products, Inc. v. F.T.C., 268 F. 2d 461 (9th Cir. 1959) (C.A. 9, 1959).
15 Keele Hair & Scalp Specialists v. F.T.C., 275 F. 2d 18, 1960 Trade Cases 69615 (5th
Cir. 1960).
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tion, the manufacturer cannot exhort the public to "save your sick hair
from trouble-breeding bacteria." 16 The prohibition of a claim that a
"Rejuvenesence Cream" brings to the user's face "the clear radiance...
the petal-like quality and texture of youth" and that it restores "natural
moisture necessary for a live, healthy skin" when, in fact, the cream
had no effect on the structure or conditions of the skin, was held to be
clearly within the FTC's regulatory powers.17 Similarly, a representa-
tion that "Glantrex" was a quick acting remedy for malaria, when its
composition was such that it could not be expected to produce any
therapeutic effect upon any known disease, was found to be false and
misleading and could be prohibited.1 8 Many other similar cases might be
cited.
Even when every statement made in the advertisement is, in itself,
literally true, the total impact of the advertisement, when read by the
audience toward whom it is directed, may not be false and misleading. 19
Thus, an advertisement for vitamin tablets which conveys the impression
that they will prevent or cure a variety of illnesses can be enjoined by
the Federal Trade Commission despite the fact that the advertisement
does not contain an explicit statement to that effect. 20 An advertise-
ment for an aspirin product for the "treatment" of arthritis, rheumatism,
swollen joints, neuritis, neuralgia, sciatica, and lumbago was ordered
discontinued because the use of the word "treatment" conveyed the im-
pression that the preparation would cure or alleviate these conditions
when, in fact, it could do no more than relieve minor pains associated
with them.2 1 Several cases have held that the use of the term "remedy,"
16 Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. F.T.C., 276 F. 2d 952, 1960 Trade Cases 69690 (2nd Cir.,
1960).
17 Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corp. v. F.T.C., 143 F. 2d 696, 1944-45 Trade Cases
57267 (2nd Cir., 1944).
'8 George G. Neff v. F.T.C., 117 F. 2d 495 (4th Cir., 1941).
19 On March 19, 1969, the Federal Trade Commission published (34 Fed. Reg. 5387)
the text of its Proposed Guides for Advertising Over-the-Counter Drugs, 16 CFR
§ 249 (Proposed). While these proposed guides have never been promulgated as final
regulations, they are valuable as an indication of the thinking of the Commission:
"General Principles ...
(a) The important criterion in determining whether an advertisement is
false and misleading is the net impression which it is likely to make on the gen-
eral population. A false impression can be conveyed by words and sentences
which although literally and technically true are formed in such a setting as to
mislead and deceive....
(c) The Commission will draw upon its own experience in interpreting ad-
vertising. It may do so without the aid of consumer testimony either as to ex-
press or implied representations. It may determine that advertising is mislead-
ing on the basis of its visual examination of exhibits even though members of
the public may testify that they were not deceived by it. An advertisement will
be regarded as deceptive if one of two or more permissible, reasonable inter-
pretations is false or misleading." 21 CFR § 249.2.
20 Stanley Laboratories, Inc. v. F.T.C., 138 F. 2d 388 (9th Cir., 1943).




when used in advertisements for cold preparations, conveys the im-
pression that the drug will cure colds, when they can do no more than
relieve the symptoms of a cold.2 2 The trade name "Outgrow" in adver-
tisements for an ingrown nail treatment preparation, without a clear
and conspicuous disclaimer to the effect that the preparation has no
effect, in any way, on the growth, shape or position of the toenail, was
held to be false and misleading. 23
The Federal Trade Commission Act . . . was not made for the pro-
tection of experts, but for the public-that vast multitude which
includes the ignorant, the unthinking and the credulous . . . . and
the fact that a false statement may be obviously false to those who
are trained and experienced does not change its character, nor take
away its power to deceive others less experienced . . . The important
criterion is the net impression which the advertisement is likely
to make on the general populace.24
The far more difficult problem is that of misrepresentation by omis-
sion of essential information, rather than misrepresentation by overt
statement. The question of whether the Federal Trade Commission can
require the pharmaceutical advertiser to include all of the information
necessary for the reader to intelligently evaluate the statements made
in his advertisement has claimed the attention of the Federal Trade
Commission and the courts in recent years and will receive detailed at-
tention in the present paper. While the law in this area appears to be
evolving very rapidly, and no case presenting the exact question has yet
reached the Supreme Court for resolution of the conflicts between va-
rious circuits,2 5 I shall attempt to describe the trends I believe are ex-
hibited by these cases.
The "classical" approach to the problem of misrepresentation by
omission of essential information is illustrated by Atberty v. Federal
Trade Commission.2 Petitioners manufactured a vitamin-mineral sup-
plement named Oxorin Tablets. A typical advertisement for Oxorin
Tablets reads:
Pep up your blood! Iron . . . (is) a principal factor in Red Blood
Cells . . . The disease fighting units of the blood. When you are
weary, tired, run-down, just dragging yourself around with no ambi-
tion left, when every effort you make seems to leave you weak and
spent, then try Oxorin Tablets, a tonic for the blood!
22 Justin Haynes & Co. v. F.T.C., 105 F. 2d 988 (2nd Cir. 1939); Koch v. F.T.C., 206
F. 2d 311 (6th Cir. 1953). Consolidated Royal Chemical Co. v. F.T.C., 191 F. 2d 891
(7th Cir. 1951).
23 Federal Trade Commission Docket Number 8478.
24 Charles of the Ritz Distributors Corp. v. F.T.C., supra, n. 12.
25 The accuracy of my "crystal ball" may soon be put to the acid test. American
Home Products, Inc. v. F.T.C. has been appealed to the Supreme Court. Food, Drug
and Cosmetic Reports ("The Pink Sheet"), Trade & Government Notes, p. 6, Sep-
tember 22, 1969.
26 180 F. 2d 36 (D.C. Cir. 1950), cert. den. 340 U.S. 818, 71 S. Ct. 49 (1951).
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After hearing extensive medical testimony, the Federal Trade Commis-
sion found that
the condition of lassitude is caused less frequently by simple iron
deficiency anemia than by other causes;
where said condition is due to other causes, medical attention is
highly desirable;
the preparation "Oxorin Tablets" will (not) have any therapeutic
effect . . . except in cases of simple iron deficiency anemia.
27
Based upon these findings, the Commission ordered the petitioner to
disclose, in his advertising, the facts that "Oxorin Tablets" would be
effective only in simple iron deficiency anemia and that most cases of
tiredness and lassitude resulted from causes other than this condition.28
The court found that the Federal Trade Commission lacked the
power to compel this type of disclosure, in that, it had failed to find a
statement which is misleading because of the consequences from the
use of the product, or a statement which is misleading because of the
things claimed in the advertisement. The realm of the F.T.C. is the
negative function of preventing falsity and not the affirmative function
of requiring, or encouraging additional interesting, and perhaps useful
information which is not essential to prevent falsity.29 The court refused
to enforce the Commission's order.
In distinct contrast, from what I have labeled the "transitory
phase," is the Sixth Circuit's opinion in the J. B. Williams case.3 0 Again,
a Federal Trade Commission order requiring affirmative disclosure in
vitamin-mineral tonic advertising was contested. The advertisements in
question were similar to those of the Alberty case:
If you often have that tired and run-down feeling .... and if you
take vitamins yet you still feel worn-out, remember . . . . your
27 Federal Trade Commission Docket Number 5101.
28 In, Kerrany, F.T.C., 265 F. 2d 246 (10th Cir. 1959), the Commission ordered peti-
tioners to cease and desist selling refined oil for lubrication without disclosing to
purchasers that the oil had been previously used. In affirming the order, the court
argued,
"The public is entitled to know the facts with respect to lubricating oil sold by
the petitioners being produced from previously used oil and then make its own
choice with respect to purchasing such oil or oil produced from virgin crude, even
though the choice is predicated at least in part upon ill-founded sentiment, belief,
or caprice. * * * And therefore the practice of the petitioners in marketing their
re-refined lubricating oil in containers indistinguishable from those used generally
to market lubricating oil refined from virgin crude, without any disclosure that it is
made from previously used oil, constitutes a deceptive practice within the intent and
meaning of section 5(a) of the Federal Trade Commission Act * * *." See also, Mary
Muffet, Inc. v. F.T.C., 194 F. 2d 504 (2d Cir. 1952); Theodore Kagen Corp. v. F.T.C.,
283 F. 2d 371 (D.C. Cir. 1960); Mohawk Refining Corp. v. F.T.C., 263 F. 2d 818 (3d
Cir. 1959); Royal Oil Corp. v. F.T.C., 262 F. 2d 741 (4th Cir. 1959); Rhodes Pharmacal
Co. v. F.T.C., 208 F. 2d 382 (7th Cir. 1953); Carter Products, Inc. v. F.T.C., 268 F. 2d
461 (9th Cir. 1959).
29 Supra, n. 26 at 37-38.




trouble may be due to iron-poor blood. And vitamins alone can't
build up iron-poor blood. But GERITOL can! . . . GERITOL be-
gins to strengthen iron-poor blood in 24 hours ... You'll feel
stronger fast in just seven days .... 31
The court reviewed the medical testimony before the Commission in
detail, and agreed with the Commission's findings that the symptoms de-
scribed in the advertisement occur in many diseases and that most
of these are unrelated to iron deficiency. 32 Indeed, even where iron de-
ficiency is implicated, tiredness and lassitude would not normally ap-
pear until the anemia became severe and, at that point, a simple iron
tonic would be ineffective as a remedy. The advertisements, the court
concluded, deceptively created the impression that a tired and run-down
feeling was universally symptomatic of iron deficiency anemia, when,
in fact, no more than 10 percent of the population with these symptoms
actually suffer from anemia, and that Geritol was suitable for treat-
ment of all cases of anemia, when, in fact, medical attention is required
in cases of severe anemia.33
The court reached back, beyond Alberty to the general principle,
hat even though each individual statement in an advertisement may
be literally true, the overall impression created by that advertisement
may not be false and misleading.
The Commission, in looking at the overall impression created by
the advertisements on the general public, could reasonably find
these advertisements were false and misleading. The finding that the
advertisements link common, non-specific symptoms with iron de-
ficiency anemia, and thereby create a false impression because most
people with these symptoms are not suffering from iron deficiency
anemia, is both reasonable and supported by substantial evidence.
The Commission is not bound to the literal meaning of the words,
nor must the Commission take a random sample to determine the
meaning and impact of the advertisements. 34
The court distinguished Alberty on the grounds that the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals had, in that case, held that the Federal
Trade Commission must find that the failure to make an affirmative
statement is misleading because of things claimed in the advertisement,
and that the Federal Trade Commission had not made such a finding.33
A finding, of this precise type, however, the Sixth Circuit continued,
was the basis of the present order.30 The court went on to point out
31 Id., appendix, Table II.
32 Supra, n. 10.
83 Id.
34 Id. at 889-890.
35 Alberty, supra n. 26.
36 Id.
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that, in two cases subsequent to Alberty, the Second 37 and Fifth3s Cir-
cuits had upheld similar orders based upon the same type of findings.
The court, however, did not require affirmative disclosure to the
complete extent sought by the Federal Trade Commission. 39 While it
enforced the Commission's order with respect to the points discussed
above, it refused to enforce a portion of the order which forbade peti-
tioner from representing or implying that iron deficiency anemia can
be self-diagnosed or can be determined without a medical test.40 With-
out citations, the court referred to a "Congressional policy in favor of
self-help" and concluded that any such requirement was beyond the
power of the Federal Trade Commission. For a short time, it appeared
that this decision would mark the limits of the "affirmative disclosure"
requirement. However, as we shall see, these boundaries have been
extended by later cases.
The rationale of the Williams case received additional support by
the Sixth Circuit in two pharmaceutical cases decided in 1968. While
neither case involved the question of affirmative disclosure, both repre-
sent strong authority for the proposition that even though every state-
ment in an advertisement may be technically true, if the overall im-
pression created is deceptive, the advertisement is false and mislead-
ing. As we have seen, this concept is integral to the reasoning of the
Williams case.
In the first of these,4 1 the petitioner, Merck & Co., objected to a
Federal Trade Commission order prohibiting it from advertising that
"Sucret" Throat Lozenges would kill the Staph and Strep germs which
are frequently associated with sore throats. Petitioner pointed out that
extensive laboratory and clinical tests had conclusively established the
efficacy of the. active ingredient of the lozenges, hexylresorcinol, in kill-
ing these microorganisms. The court found, however, that:
The evidence supports the following conclusions by the Commis-
sion: (1) that regardless of whether Sucrets can kill germs on the
surface of the throat, they will not kill such bacteria in a manner
that is medically significant; (2) that Sucrets cannot effectively at-
tack (the) viruses which cause a viral sore throat; and (3) that
Sucrets do not cure or help cure an existing sore throat infec-
tion.4 2
Further, streptococcal throat infections represent a particular hazard
in that, untreated, these infections frequently lead to acute rheumatic
37 Ward Laboratories, Inc. v. F.T.C., 276 F. 2d 952 (2d Cir. 1960).
38 Keele Hair and Scalp Specialists v. F.T.C., 275 F. 2d 18 (5th Cir. 1960).
39 Supra n. 37, 38.
40 Id.
41 Doherty, Clifford, Steers & Sheffield, Inc. and Merck & Co. v. F.T.C., 392 F. 2d 921
(6th Cir. 1968).




fever or nephritis. Thus, the court concluded, while the petitioner's
product may kill staph and strep germs, to allow him to advertise that
fact would allow him to create a misleading, and potentially dangerous,
overall impression. The Commission's order was upheld in its en-
tirety.43
The second case involve our old friend, Preparation-H.44 The ad-
vertisement in question read:
Doctors report a new healing medication . . . Preparation-H...
actually shrinks hemorrhoids without surgery. Tests in famous
hospitals and clinics reveal: Preparation-H relieves pain promptly-
heals injured tissue. The secret? Only Preparation-H has the new
wonder substance we call Bio-Dyne to draw the body's own healing
oxygen to the painful area. Here are the dramatic results: One-
Preparation-H relieves pain and itching promptly. Two-Prepara-
tion-H heals injured tissue. And three-Preparation-H shrinks
hemorrhoids . . even, in cases of twenty years' suffering
Preparation-H shrinks hemorrhoids without surgery!
Petitioner introduced evidence, at the Federal Trade Commission hear-
ing, of a clinical study which showed that Preparation-H did, in fact,
relieve the pain and itching associated with hemorrhoids and, in many
cases, reduced the size of the affected area. Nine proctologists, special-
ists in diseases of the rectal area, testified before the Commission, how-
ever, that the only known permanent cure for hemorrhoids was surgical
removal or ligation of the varicose veins which are the underlying
cause of the ailment. Ointments or suppositories, such as Preparation-H,
could only provide temporary relief of the symptoms associated with
hemorrhoids. Further, the physicians testified, the astringent contained
in Preparation-H, "Bio-Dyne," had no significant value in the treat-
ment of the disease.45
The Commission found that the total impact of the advertisement
was a false and misleading implication that Preparation-H would cure
hemorrhoids. It issued a broad and complex order prohibiting petitioner
from misrepresenting, directly or by implication, the efficacy of Prepara-
tion-H or any other drug.46 The use of the word "Bio-Dyne," or any
other word which implies the existence of a unique healing ingredient,
was specifically prohibited. 47
While the court found that the order, as written, was too broad in
that it prohibited claims that Preparation-H would, in many cases, af-
ford temporary relief from pain and itching and prohibited misrepre-
sentations of other drugs not involved in the hearing, it upheld the
43 Id. at 929.
44 American Home Products, Inc. v. F.T.C., 402 F. 2d 232 (6th Cir. 1968).
45 Id. at 236.
46 Id. at 237.
47 Id.
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major part of the Commission's order.48 It remanded the order to the
Commission for the removal of the overbroad parts, but issued an in-
junction pendente lite prohibiting the petitioner from disseminating any
advertisements in connection with Preparation-H which "(1) represents,
directly or by implication, that the use of such product will (a) avoid
the need for surgery as a treatment for hemorrhoids or hemorrhoidal
surgery, (b) heal, cure or remove hemorrhoids or eliminate the prob-
lem of hemorrhoids, or (2) contains any reference to the word 'Bio-
Dyne.' "49
The limitations on the Federal Trade Commission's power to re-
quire affirmative disclosure, articulated in the J. B. Williams case, ap-
pear to have been removed in the Sixth Circuit's most recent opinion °
in the area of over-the-counter pharmaceutical advertisements. Once
again, a Federal Trade Commission order concerning a vitamin-mineral
preparation for the treatment of "tiredness" symptoms was before the
court. The order being considered was similar to that of the J. B.
Williams case; it required affirmative disclosure of the facts that tired-
ness and lassitude are caused by many diseases other than iron de-
ficiency and that SSS Tonic is effective only for the treatment of
simple iron deficiency anemia. In addition, the order required affirma-
tive disclosure of the fact that iron deficiency anemia cannot be self-
diagnosed.
The radio advertisement in question read:
Do you find yourself missing out on the fun of life? . . . Maybe
you're suffering from Iron Deficiency Anemia-low blood power.
If so, what you need is Three-S Tonic . . . rich in iron to help
build back your blood power. . . restore your energy . . . help you
feel better fast!
The court agreed with the Commission that the advertisement cre-
ated the false impression that tiredness and lack of pep or energy were
48 Id. at 238.
49 The end of the Preparation-H controversy is not yet in sight. On remand, the
Federal Trade Commission redrafted its order to eliminate those portions which the
court found to be too broad, but added a requirement of affirmative disclosure of the
fact that, where Preparation-H reduces swelling, it is effective only where the swell-
ing is "caused by edema, infection, or inflammation," thus ruling out a flat claim that
the product will "help shrink hemorrhoids." Food, Drug and Cosmetic Reports ("The
Pink Sheet"), p. 13, August 4, 1969. American Home Products, the manufacturer of
Preparation-H has appealed the revised order. Food, Drug and Cosmetic Reports
("The Pink Sheet"), p. 12, December 1, 1969.
In a very recent case, Bristol-Myers, Inc. v. F.T.C., 424 F. 2d 934 (5th Cir. 1970),
the Fifth Circuit has taken an almost identical stand regarding a similar FTC order
involving advertising for Pazo, another hemorrhoid preparation. Judge Skelton, the
author of the opinion, stated that he had found the Sixth Circuit's Preparation-H
opinion to be of "great help" and that he had "borrowed extensively from it." Food,
Drug and Cosmetics Reports ("The Pink Sheet"), p. 12, December 1, 1969.
50 SSS Company, Inc. and Tucker Wayde & Company, Inc. v. F.T.C., 416 F. 2d 226
(6th Cir. 1969), Food, Drug and Cosmetic Reports ("The Pink Sheet"), Trade and




the result of iron deficiency anemia, and would be cured by Three-S
Tonic. 51 The truth, the court found, was that only a small minority
of people suffer from these symptoms as a result of iron deficiency
anemia, and in most cases, these symptoms are attributable to other
causes which cannot be treated by Three-S Tonic. Further, the vitamins
and herbs in the preparation are worthless in the treatment of iron de-
ficiency anemia. The court found its decision in J. B. Williams controlling
on these points and upheld this portion of the Commission's order.
The court reconsidered the "self-medication" limitation it had ex-
pressed in J. B. Williams and, relying heavily on Commissioner Elman's
opinion, concluded that "self-medication" did not include "self-diag-
nosis." The distinction, the court said, between the two concepts had
not been made by the Commission in the J. B. Williams case, nor had it
been argued before the court.52 While the court continued to recognize.
a strong Congressional policy in favor of self-help, this, the court said,
cannot be considered to include self-diagnosis where sophisticated clini-
cal tests are required to ascertain the existence of a disorder such as
iron deficiency anemia.53 "Regardless of the propriety of the applica-
tion of the Congressional policy favoring self-help in J. B. Williams
Company, we think it is inapplicable here. . . . In a case such as this,
the fact that Congress may not have a policy against self-medication on
a trial-and-error basis where the product is not harmful. . . cannot
be used to sanction misleading advertising material." 54
The petitioner argued that the Commission's order constituted a
violation of its First Amendment right of free speech.55 The court dis-
posed of this argument without difficulty. "They are free to advertise
their product; they are prohibited only from making false and mislead-
ing statements which they have no constitutional right to disseminate."
The Sixth Circuit upheld the order in its entirety.
Recognizing the dangers of generalizing from a few cases in a single
Circuit, I believe that S.S.S. Corp. v. Federal Trade Commission is in-
dicative of the shape of things to come. Pharmaceutical advertising is
to be held to a standard of absolute truthfulness. Not only must every
statement made in those advertisements be literally and technically
true, and not only must the total impact of the advertisement, when
read by the audience towards whom it is directed, be true, but, where
additional facts are required to properly evaluate the meaning of a
statement in that advertising, affirmative disclosure of these facts will be
required.
The Federal Trade Commission apparently agrees with this evalua-
51 Id. at 228.
52 Id. at 229.
53 Id. at 230.
54 Id. at 230-31.
55 Id. at 231.
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ation. In their Proposed Guides for Advertising Over-the-Counter
Drugs56  the Commission has included the following tenative state-
ment:
An advertisement may be found to be deceptive not merely by
what it says but by what it fails to say. . . An affirmative disclosure
may be required in advertisements of over-the-counter drugs when
it is necessary to prevent deception. In such cases, the disclosure
should be clear and conspicuous . . . Affirmative disclosure will be
permitted, as a substitute for an outright ban on an advertising
claim found misleading or deceptive, only when disclosure will be
fully effective in preventing deception and a more complete prohibi-
tion is unnecessary. 57
The implication of the last sentence is particularly instructive. If
a product cannot be advertised in such a manner as to avoid all possi-
bility of deception, it may not be advertised at all!
The regulation of over-the-counter pharmaceutical advertising is in
the vanguard of current regulatory developments. This is undoubtedly
because of the highly technical nature of these advertisements, the in-
ability of the lay public to accurately evaluate the validity of claims
based upon scientific and medical facts, and the consequent potential
for abuse and the danger to the public inherent in these advertise-
ments. However, there is no reason to believe that the requirement of
affirmative disclosure will be limited to pharmaceutical products. Al-
ready, a scattering of cases in other areas has upheld this requisite in
other areas when special problems have been encountered.5 8 I am
convinced that the stringent requirement of absolute truthfulness, ap-
parent in the most recent over-the-counter pharmaceutical cases, will
ultimately become the sine qua non for all advertising.
56 34 Fed. Reg. 5287, 21 CFR § 249 (Proposed); Cf., supra n. 14.
57 21 CFR § 249.2 (a) and (d) (Proposed).
58 Cf., for example, Kerran v. F.T.C., supra n. 28, where the court affirmed an order
by the Commission requiring affirmative disclosure of the fact that the oil sold to
plaintiff was reprocessed used oil when there was no other way to distinguish it
from new material, and Bantam Books, Inc. v. F.T.C., 275 F. 2d 680 (2nd Cir. 1960),
where plaintiff was required to print the word "abridged" in "clear and conspicuous
type" on the front cover of any abridged book it published.
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